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## THE GREATEST PROBLEM IN VALUE.

THE greatest problem in value I take to be the truth-value. Truth is not itself value. Eternally valid truths must be held to exist without reference to the judging individual. Such universal truths or principles are known in rational intuition; they are the norms or standards of all thinking; and they are, as truths of reason, to be distinguished from facts or the knowledge of particular realities. These *Wahrheiten* must be held to exist eternally, irrespective of their apprehension or not by the human species. They do not exist simply as having a place in the stream of practical development, but are universal, necessary, objective. The truth about a fact does not come after the fact, nor the truth about a reality come after the reality: without truth, neither fact nor reality would be. Truth, however, as truth, is to be distinguished from fact and from reality. Truth is that which is true in itself, and is not mere appearance, as Kant wrongly supposed. When an American philosophical writer says he "cannot conceive by what right a human philosophy has ever announced that the Eternal Order" is "true," I answer, by the best of rights, that of rational intuition. Truth is the most universal presupposition of all thought. But there are ways in which we have come to speak of the truth-value. If we say, "this rose is red," we express only a truth-value or a truth-judgment. Truth-value, if we do use the word value here, is absolute. Truth is the only value that cannot be

denied without contradiction; it is the only value that is really absolute. Goodness, for example, carries universal validity for every subject; but it is not valid for every object; in a sense, therefore, it is not absolute. But there is no object to which the truth test cannot be applied. The validity of truth is absolute, and without condition of any sort. Truth is independent of our knowing, but yet dominates our thought. Truth is thus the central determining value of our conscious reflective life. Truth in objective significance is not what James absurdly called an "inert static relation": that cannot be rightly termed "inert" which is in itself the most potent principle and factor in the world, effecting by its very being or presence the cleavage between the worlds of the true and the false. Even the good presupposes the true, truth being the supreme rational good. Of course, all this is without prejudice to the accepted fact that theoretic or truth-values, as apprehended by us, are never untinged by emotional color.

But there is the large class of judgments that go beyond the truth-value; judgments, I mean, concerning what is good, which express not only the objective value-principle of truth, but the subordinate value-principle of morality. Now, the problem of value, as it has appeared in recent German philosophies of the more extreme value-character, has been seen capable of presentation—if it is to rest upon any theory of knowledge—only on the presupposition that truth itself could be treated as value, in the same way and sense as the other values—goodness and beauty. Hence the post-Kantian "philosophy of spirit" has been replaced in the Windelband-Rickertian representations, by a "philosophy of value," of fundamentally Romantic character and tendency. But it has not been consistently or successfully done. Windelband has attempted it in ways or modes which, without justification, subordinate truth-values to the other universally valid values, instead of coordinating

these last properly, and subordinating them to the truth-values, which may be regarded as, *par excellence*, philosophy. If it must be allowed that Windelband seeks a theory of knowledge, it must be said that he does so only in a peculiar sense of the term. He deals not really with the question wherein truth consists, but only with the way in which man reaches it. His task is thus not one as to theoretic truth, nor yet a psychological one, but one as to theory of knowledge, or theoretic knowing, in the peculiar sense in which that is meant by him. "Peculiar," I say, because he treats laws and categories which are usually taken for truth, as mere means thereto. He holds to the doctrine that judgment is an act of the will *par excellence*, emphasizing our spontaneity in the outgoing of this will-moment in knowledge. In this way he hopes to found a primacy of the practical reason in logic. Windelband fails to realize that the truth-value is a higher inquiry than that after any of the other universally valid values, and so he unwarrantably inclines to coordinate it with them in an untenable way.

There are many defects and inconsistencies in Rickert's value-attempts also, although I am not now called on to detail them. His attempt, however, to equalize the logical and the ethical conscience is, it must be said, a very strained and unsatisfactory affair. He expressly says that the *Sollen*, as object to the judging subject, is not something to be understood, or to be thought, but a *Sollen* which is transcendent, does not exist as fact, but is timelessly valid. He sharply opposes it to being. The *Sollen* is not pure value, he says: value belongs to the *Sollen* only as it is related to a recognizing subject. Truth, to Rickert, is nothing else than recognition of the *Sollen*. Now, an unknown logical *Sollen* interpreted through an unknown ethical *Sollen* seems to me a case of *obscurum per obscurius*; the logical conscience, we are told, is only a particular form

of the ethical conscience in general. The theoretic function is, on Rickert's philosophy of values, erroneously reduced to a practical one, by the object of knowledge being taken, not as that which is, but as that which ought to be. Rickert's is no more satisfactory than was Fichte's attempt to condition all theoretic knowledge on moral law, in crass neglect of the natural order and experience. The fundamental concept of ethics, it is said, becomes in Rickert's way raised to the dignity of the true! How *can* that be, when, on his own showing, the true only reaches its own dignity as drawn from duty-fulfilment? The dignity of the true he has already destroyed by his reduction of the logical conscience—a procedure which leaves the knowledge-problem quite unsolved. A transcendent *Sollen* will not satisfy the metaphysical view of things and their profound unity, which certainly cannot be subsumed under our moral experience. This would make the human spirit, with the values Rickert provides for it, a simple monstrosity in such a world as that we have on our hands. Duty does not call us to transcend consciousness in the absolute fashion projected by Rickert; such an *ought-to-be*, detached from all thought, feeling, and will, belonging to an absolutely transcendent order, is neither necessary to knowledge nor consonant with it. Knowledge belongs to the real order of things, in which the object exists independently of the cognitive act. It is not the case, as Rickert pretends, that knowledge has to do only with the ideal, not with the real: knowledge is a thing of individual experience, and not referable to an abstract and fictional *Bewusstsein überhaupt*, correspondent to nothing in reality. Such knowledge of the world of reality gives truth or existential judgments, not judgments of value. Rickert fails to do any manner of justice to the world of natural reality. Obviously, the entire procedure of Rickert would make the truth-value an ethical value, as one finds already suggested,

long before, in Ulrici (*Gott und der Mensch*, Vol. II, pp. 131-136). Although Ulrici makes truth an ethical idea, he does not mean to deny that the universal logical categories are truth in the form of concept; but he chooses to concern himself too exclusively with truth as it comes to consciousness in us; and he makes it an ethical idea, as desired by us as beings of an ethical character and determination. Whether in this he does justice to the place and functions of reason and intellect in the apprehension of truth is another matter, and one on which I am inclined to think he lays a rather onesided ethical stress. But such a stress was rather unusual in 1873. In the strange fashion already described does Rickert try to carry out his idea of making the theory of knowledge the base of all philosophy. His theory of knowledge is, of course, ethically swamped. His conclusion, unsatisfactory enough, is that our knowing rests upon a resolution of the will. Surely a not very theoretic *finale*. The perception of truth is, in my judgment, far too completely an act of the intellect, not directly dependent on the will, to belong, in any primary fashion, to ethical character or choice: one believes on evidence, and has no choice in the matter. Rickert actually takes the position that for the man who wills not truth, its validity is not to be grounded. That is true only where consent of the will is called for, in respect of ethical truth, that there may be harmony of the will with truth already known by the reason. The sphere of ethics ought to be distinguished from that of correct thinking. Instead of which, Rickert reduces the truth to the good. Rickert is thus found, in his whole position, badly confounding the psychologically real grounds of judgment with the logical grounds of the truth of judgment. But the logician does not admit that subjective desires and prepossessions have to do with truth. The truth of a logical concept is, to him, independent of experience; a concept may be a true concept, apart from

whether anything real corresponds to it. Eternal truths, he holds, have nothing to do with the subjectivity of the individual. Rickert fails to recognize knowledge of being, because he does not fully distinguish pure logic, or theory of truth, from theory of knowledge, or noëtics. Not psychology, but logic, has to do with absolute, unconditioned truth.

Truth, so taken, is no factual affair, and does not belong to space and time. Truth is eternal and independent of the judging individual. Husserl not only contends that truth is above all temporality, but holds the absolute truth and validity of logical laws, concepts, and judgments, though with his positions *in extenso* I am not here concerned. Volkelt has urged that it is reference for proof "to a somewhat, separate from us, and not possessed by us, which gives their peculiar significance to the expressions of certainty and logical compulsion." Bradley, whose discussion is valuable albeit he does not at all points express himself quite consistently, says "truths must exist in a mind"; "but the truth itself does not consist in its existence in me"; yet he adds, "truth may not be truth at all apart from its existence" in "finite subjects" (*Essays in Truth and Reality*, p. 87). To the last expression, some exception may certainly be taken, in the light of what has been already advanced. He does better when he says that though he "can find in truth the satisfaction of a want," in which case "its existence" in himself depends "at least very largely" on the will, yet he "cannot regard its nature as subject" to the will (*ibid.*, p. 87). The step which Bradley rightly refuses to take was taken by Münsterberg's voluntarism, which takes truth to be won by willing, by our creative activities. Truth is thus created, not copied. The doer, or, it may be, the deed, not merely finds, but, on this theory, is, the truth. No satisfactory theory of the objectivity of truth is possible on such a basis. Even the volun-

tarism of Royce holds, in a very objectionable form, "that all truth is indeed relative to the expression of our will," although "the will inevitably determines for itself forms of activity which are objectively valid and absolute" (paper at the Congress of Philosophy in Heidelberg, 1908). It appears to me that to mix up the will in its action in this fashion is to make the truth question no longer a logical one at all. To that I shall return presently. Bradley, of whom I have spoken, goes on to maintain (p. 88) that truth, like beauty, is, from one side—the side of essence— independent of the will, although there is another and practical side in which truth involves need and desire. In this sense, truth is "the satisfaction of a want" (p. 87), but there is truth, for all that, which transcends individual life. The objective and transcendent character of such truth was already finely expressed by Augustine. Thus truth is "at once dependent and free." Says Mr. Joachim, "independent truth itself" yet lives in "finite minds," but it does not so, in my view, simply and solely *as* my thought. All this amounts to what I prefer to designate as truth absolute and truth relative, and it is with the former aspect I am now mainly concerned. Truth in this absolute sense is, in its essence, eternal: truth is not made by us, as James and Dewey have maintained. I hold, like Bradley, their supposition to be absurd and untenable. I do not "make" truth save in the subjective sense that, but for my mind and truth's entering into it, truth would not exist for me at all. But truth itself I have not "made"; no more can I destroy it; and the objection that there is no objective or independent truth cannot be sustained. It is the nature of truth, not its supposed "making," that concerns us.

Essential truth is not man-made; there is inherent absurdity in the supposition, as Bradley has sufficiently shown. Schopenhauer held that truth is the reference of a judgment to something outside itself, as its sufficient ground,

while Hegel thought that by truth was chiefly to be understood that I *know* how something *is*; this is truth only in relation to consciousness. Kant, Hegel, and Kuno Fischer regard truth as consisting in the agreement of the concept with its object, as did J. E. Erdmann, to whom "that is true which is known as it is." But, for all the talk concerning the *adaequatio intellectus cum re*, it will be found, I believe, that we are more indebted to Aquinas in this matter than to any subsequent philosopher whatsoever. And in all these cases, the "object," I contend, must be far wider than actual reality, as we shall see. I do not agree with Lotze that truths exist only in the thought, of a thinker, for there is truth that is before him, and waits for his finding or discovery. It is this objectivity of truth that has impelled to truth's quest at all times. Lotze, however, thinks the mind "only recognizes truth in as far as it belongs to its own nature from all eternity," a somewhat far-fetched connection; "truth that was originally unconnected with it," it could not "comprehend"; "it cannot be external to him, who is to recognize it"; "its recognition is only thinkable as cognition of our own being in it" (*Mikrokosmos*, Vol. II, p. 698). But the externality of truth need surely not be such as to keep us from knowing it, any more than the externality of nature prevents our recognition of it: in both cases the mind is destined to knowledge; in the case of truth, it is made a real and inward possession. But I should beg to be excused from taking Bradley's "I have now a toothache" as a sample of the eternality of truth (*Essays in Truth and Reality*, p. 340), because both it, and the reasons supporting it, appear to me absurdly inadequate. I hold truth to be one, and reality one, but the unity of truth—the congruous and harmonious character of all truth—is not to me the unity of a whole made up, by treating truth as an existent, of partial truths, all of which, as parts of a whole, are only

partially true. There are many concentric circles within the orb of truth. But, in the view I am speaking of, "the true" is said to be "the Whole," short of which no isolated truth can be completely true. This whole, however, is supposed to be an organic unity or significant whole, "all its constituent elements reciprocally" involving one another or determining one another's being. Such is the supposed whole of truth, short of which no truths are perfectly true. This theory of truth has too many difficulties, some of which I am now pointing out, while some have been dealt with by Mr. Bertrand Russell (*Proceedings of Aristotelian Society*, 1907), and some by Dr. Aveling (*Proceedings of Aristotelian Society*, 1915) for it to be satisfactory. There are many isolated judgments or single propositions which, as Russell remarks, must be held "true in a sense in which their contradictories are not true." Those propositions I take for true, which are in character universal, and not particular; the particular is immediately experienced, and neither asks to be, nor can be, proved. No particular truth, indeed, is true, except through universal truth. But the general truth is not derived from the particular truth; such is seen to be the case in such a general truth as that all the diameters of the same circle are equal. Bradley makes truth ideal, yet practically treats it as an existent, and merges it in reality. But even when truth is taken as value, such value is valid, but not existent. But truth is to Bradley in a sense a failure, since it comes short, in the view of his *Appearance and Reality*, of being "quite identical with reality", in which latter it may even be "swallowed up". But this cannot be, since truth is about reality, with which it is not to be thus identified or confounded. Truth is not to be, as Dewey has said of Bradley, "a sort of transcendent essence on its own account" (*Mind*, July, 1907, p. 334).

Truth is not merged or transformed into reality; com-

pleted truth must still be truth, and not a merging in the concrete whole, termed the Absolute. There are primary and self-evident truths or principles which are recalcitrant to such a mode of treatment, as connected only with concrete reality. It is said that "truth is a word which has no meaning without the implicate of reality" (G. T. Ladd, *Theory of Knowledge*, p. 58). Now, when it is said that truth and reality are correlative, or that truth is the intellectual equivalent of reality, though the range of the correctness of the statement may be obvious, yet it is not to me wholly satisfying, since it involves reality being taken in a sense so unusual as to seem unreal. To make it satisfactory, we should need to extend the sphere of being or reality so as to include truths that seem unreal in a merely factual sense. The figures of geometry, for example, must be held real, as being the true ones of conception, a point which Mill failed to appreciate. Erdmann is therefore found saying that a so-called actual parabola is none, while a true one is that which is found in its formula. Locke strongly held mathematical truths—of figures and their properties—true and real apart from all "real existence in matter." The universal thought-forms, as in logic and mathematics, severed from all determinate content, can be object of thought and inquiry, and are then neither unreal nor untrue. Their objective truth and validity cannot properly be denied. They are no hypotheses, framed to explain determinate appearances. Such thought is still a fact of mental life, valid and indispensable. The question is one of theory of knowledge, not of metaphysics. We may say their objective validity is *sui generis*, but the judgments belong to the sphere of truth all the same, and no theory or system of truth but must take full account of them. Factual truth means that the quality of the facts is such that they are true. But truth cannot be confined to brute fact; there is also propositional truth, to which being

cannot without stultification be denied, if any comprehensive view of truth is to be taken. This seems necessary to remember, when we are told that all truth "must be referred to the test of reality" (G. T. Ladd, *Theory of Knowledge*, p. 454). Of course, I admit, in what has been said, that being real imports more than simply being, which latter is the widest and most fundamental category. Rosmini held that, in the last analysis, the truth of a thing is just its being. Truth and being were to him equivalent. The truth of knowledge was, to him, known being. What was conformable to ideal being was, for him, true. But such a complete identification of truth with being, as Rosmini made, cannot be held admissible or correct, since truth is not being, but only a quality, property, or attribute of being. We see, then, that there is objective truth in itself as well as truth for us.

Again, when it is contended that truth means such a judgment as corresponds to the being of the really existent, we may again feel that this reference to existents, however we may have to accept it, does not seem satisfyingly to cover the whole conceivable range and extent of truth. Of course, a truth is not truth, if it be not real, and so we are haunted by the shadow of reality again, and yet the truth may be so ideal that the thought of the really existent is repellent in such a connection. Yet there are important thinkers to-day who allow only those judgments to be true, of which the objective fact is really existent. Surely there are evident judgments, where no concrete actuality of the objectives are concerned, that cannot be false. Mathematics and formal logic are examples in their remoteness from ordinary reality: truth, in their purest results, springs up in independence—it might even be said, because of the independence—of real existents, since they both belong to the sphere of things not seen. Why, then, can it be quite satisfactory for philosophers to keep on binding all truth to

association with the really existent? These truths—I mean, of pure mathematics and formal logic—may be pure abstractions, but you do not deny them the name of truth, because they are abstract and independent of reality, even though they not be incapable of being brought into some sort of relation to, and bearing upon, reality. I am, of course, well aware of those philosophical quarters in which it is blankly denied that there is any abstract truth, or truth in itself, but I do not think such denial is conformable to true reason. The truths of pure mathematics and formal logic, of which I have been speaking, are completely and unconditionally true, independently of their place in this or that particular mind. So absolute are the truths of pure logic that to deny them is simply to reassert them in new form. Royce seems to me right in claiming that recent thought and discovery in respect of the system of geometrical truth, and the sphere of logical analysis, tend to a more rigid and objective conception of truth, to fundamental thinking. There was no occasion to mar this statement by tacking his absurd absolute voluntarism on to it. The truth-relations seem, in such cases, to be, in a sense, absolute; one may at least say, free of contingency and of caprice. Yet the Absolute seems to me a conception that goes beyond mathematics as concerned with the quantitative, which, however indefinitely expanded, is no more than one form of the infinite.

But the independence of truth is to be seen in the world of concrete reality also. Prof. Lloyd Morgan, in an able and interesting paper (*Proceedings of Aristotelian Society*, 1917), concludes to the presence of extra-mental “truth in the structure of the knowable world,” which, he says, “may not yet be known—perhaps may never be known by us,” but which “is there all the same”; also, “truth in the structure of the sphere of knowledge,” marked by consistency; and finally, “truth as correspondence” of the two spheres—

knowledge and the knowable—just spoken of. He does not mean anything “static” by truth-structure, since the knowable world is in the making, under development and evolution. This line of thought does not necessarily help us greatly, as it stands, toward the determination of absolute and eternal truth. I mean, individual phenomena in the empiric world, simply taken, do not enable you to reach absolute truth, only supersensible law being the really true. But it is of interest and value over against the contention of James that “theoretic truth” dwells “*within* the mind.” It militates in certain ways against the pragmatism and instrumentalism that make all truth instrumental and relative, and reduce truth to a biological and psychological value. Truth, in such a view, grows with our growth, and changes with our needs. Truth is, on this theory, just our control of the objects of experience, and that is the use of scientific hypotheses. The truth of ideas lies in their empirical value, in how far they “work.” This is made the sole criterion of truth. Truth is a mere social product, to this view. A useful enough aspect of truth, so far as it goes, but inadequate, as a theory of truth, since it is too individualistic, and never gets so far as to become objective, and supra-temporal in significant import; it is one which was not wholly absent from Socrates, the Sophists, the Stoics, and the Epicureans, though developed and set in novel forms in our time. But the true in itself is not sought, nor believed in; what is true is true only for the subject; individual instinct figures too largely in pragmatist knowledge, instead of the theoretic knowledge which seeks after universal rules. But will does not make a knowledge-content for truth; truth in its objectivity is independent of the knowing subject’s acknowledgement of it. Akin to the pragmatist view is that of Höffding when, in his *Problems of Philosophy*, he makes truth a dynamic concept, as representing the application of mental energy; but this is only

one side of the truth, and is defective in respect of the other aspect, on which I am insisting. It is mere gratuitous dogmatism when Höffding says every static aspect of truth must be given up in favor of practicality and working-value. His view, true so far as it goes, remains unconvincing, subjective, and lacking in grasp of truth- or reality-values. Lloyd Morgan's view, which I have touched upon, is objective over against such subjectivity, but his view is also evolutionary, and, in some senses at least, relativistic. Says he, "Ask the physicist, the chemist, the physiologist—ask any representative man of science—where truth lives and has its home awaiting discovery, and he will say it is out there in that which it is his special business to interpret." So little does the scientist "make" truth, or even empirical truths, and the scientific conscience will remain refractory to being subsumed under Rickert's ethical conscience.

It may be noted that in Dr. Schiller's rhetorical declamations against "The Rationalistic Conception of Truth" (*Proceedings of Aristotelian Society*, 1909), he is really concerning himself with how truth is in the subject; he is simply speaking in a different tongue from those who contend that truth is objective and independent, and signifies agreement with transcendent reality. Refutation can obviously not be effected by him in such a way. The truth is, that in our knowledge of the objectively real world, taking reality in its widest sense, as in our knowledge of the ethical world, we run up against standards of truth that are absolute, and try in vain to rid ourselves of truth which is absolute and eternal. In these realms we come upon truths, axioms, principles, laws, and ideals of reason which are universally valid and eternal. These carry for us objective validity as principles and laws of things, and as norms that regulate all thinking and all knowing, because in them reason is realized. Logical laws, like the law of identity and the law of contradiction, suggest themselves

as examples. Logical axioms are universal, because true, not true because universal. In these, as in the case of absolute truths in pure mathematics, I believe, with Russell as against Royce, that we must hold the truths quite independent—in their absolute truth-aspect—of our constructive processes. The relations of numbers, or such a statement as that two straight lines cannot enclose a space, are examples of a condition of things not to be altered without contradiction, by any will-determination of ours whatsoever. As truths of reason, their contradictories are impossible. Of course, the objectivity of number carries no spatial signification, as Dr. A. T. Shearman properly notes (*The Scope of Formal Logic*, p. 139). Besides, the truths of number are independent of all time and circumstance, and are not of the nature of real existents: their reality consists in their validity. These are the positions maintained by Bolzano, by Lotze, consistently or not in his *Logic*, and by Husserl. Again, if we make truth consist in the agreement of the subject with the object, we see the difficulty of this in the ethical sphere, where the object is no real or concrete affair. It is another proof that object or reality must, as I have contended, be taken in a far wider sense than philosophers have done—must be taken to mean an object physical or mental, apart from the perceiving mind. Whatever the nature of the object, our thought is true because the object is as we think it. So far well; but I do not think we have sufficiently probed the true when we have, in current philosophical fashion, made it the mere reflection of being, and have not regarded it as something which has itself being.

Théré has in recent years been a quickened interest in the nature of truth, which is good to see; but I am by no means sure that any great or satisfying philosophical advance has been made. There is still need, as Leibniz pointed out, not to be content to consider truth “from the

outside and merely to call it by its name, but penetrate into its recesses and perceive distinctly the logic and harmony contained in it." But the current conception of truth as agreement with reality does not seem to partake greatly of this inward character, for it regards thought and thing as two very isolated terms, and makes truth consist in the mere agreement of the former with the latter. But knowledge or thought is thus a mere pendant of things, and deeper or anterior aspects of the true do not seem to me to be reached in this way. I mean, there is truth of being—ontological, or if you will, transcendental truth—not reached by such posterior descriptive knowledge. But, although truth is invoked in being, the concept of truth is not to be thought of as involved in the concept of being: the distinctiveness of each is to be maintained. Truth is essentially inclusive of being; the form of the true calls, by its very nature, for being. These remarks are corrective of Rosmini's view, already referred to.

Not much has been done by pragmatism toward a coherent theory of truth, and the efforts of Bradley and others toward a monistic theory of truth—a logical monism resting, in a certain way, on an ontological monism—is by no means in all respects satisfying, as I have shown. Unity of truth, no doubt, we must have, but whether it is to be such a simple unity—organic in the sense meant in that theory—or whether it may not be the unity of harmony, mutual consistency or agreement between different grades or circles or levels of truth, is the question. Bergson also, it should be noted, is fundamentally preoccupied with existence, to the neglect of pure thought, as in logic and mathematics, so that I conceive his theory of knowledge and of truth to be defective. I am by no means sure that the modern attempts at simplicity and unification, in respect of truth, are improvements upon the forgotten efforts of the older philosophers. They saw the difficulty of arriving at

a single definition of truth, its significance being so wide at the fullest, and the forms of truth so diverse and variant. But they viewed truth, in whichever of its many forms found, as always expressive of some sort of equation or correspondence, although I do not think even this covered the whole case for truth, as I shall presently show. They distinguished between the different kinds of truth, however, and surely philosophy is still concerned with definition, distinction, and difference, through which alone satisfactory ultimate unity can be reached. Some of them enumerated logical truth, or the correspondence between thought and its laws; conceptual truth, or the correspondence between thought and object; ontological—sometimes termed transcendental—truth, or the correspondence of thought with being; and moral truth. But the true was practically regarded as matter of posterior knowledge or aspect only. Others spoke of *veritas entis*, *veritas cognitionis*, and *veritas signi*, while yet others made the distinctions of “entitative,” “objective,” and “formal” truth, the last including signs. They all recognized the importance of the fundamental category of being, as the ground of all truth—that truth “by which a thing is what it is”; and we have need to recognize the manifold senses in which we still speak of being or reality.

Truth may be the simple equivalent of reality, so long as you are only speaking of things, but there is wider reality than that of things, and to this wider reality truth or thought is related. Indeed, Schelling preferred to understand truth as agreement of a thought-content with itself, rather than agreement of thought with an object. But this latter has its truth and value, and it does not seem that it can be set aside in this way. But it is not enough to say that that which is, has truth of being. If we say the object of my thought is always reality, then reality must be more widely taken than concrete reality. Would the logician

think of denying, in respect of thoughts or of feelings, that they exist—have truth of being? The reality of thought lies, of course, in its being thought, the reality of feeling in its being felt. In like manner, we say a law or a relation exists or is real, but its being or reality is not that of things. But would the older procedure be sustained to-day when it said that a concept, which had admittedly truth of being in it, was not a true concept, because no reality existed corresponding to it? Conceptual truth only, if you will, but still truth after its kind. If the logician thinks a truth, which is necessary to thought, but has no outward reality existing corresponding to it, is his truth to be held, as in the older view, not true? Must we not recognize that there is a truth or logic of consistency, as well as a truth or logic of factual experience? In which case, the accordance of the notions—whose laws of reality are derived from reason—is the criterion of truth. This is knowledge through judgment or reflection, into which error may enter through default of reason, while the other case—that of the object in perception—is knowledge by intuition. But not even experience, properly conceived, is tied down to truths or judgments that relate to reality, in the ordinary sense of that term. Reality should therefore stand for anything that may affect consciousness, whether it be a fact of nature, or a mental fact, standing apart from the perceiving mind. Surely if truth is to be taken as correlative of reality, reality must be construed in a very wide sense indeed, if there is to be a thoroughly consistent procedure in dealing with supposed being or reality. At any rate, what many-faceted terms being and reality are, must be more taken account of in truth discussions. Something more is required than merely to talk of “the thoroughgoing unity of reality,” when it is evident that reality is being restricted to one particular sense, that of outer reality. But the fact is that truth is really that to which reality should, in es-

sence and character, conform or correspond, rather than something that, less satisfactorily, must conform to reality. For there cannot be reality—whatever appearance there may be—unless the true has anteriorly gone to the making of it. It is the losing sight of this inner aspect of the case that has made truth remain the outside affair—defective, as Bradley admits, because it is merely “about” reality—it has been so much allowed to be. But truth is that transcendental quality of being which relates it to intellect. We have no right to neglect the other side of the shield, the *adaequatio rei cum intellectu*, as is almost invariably done. Things are true through a first or primal truth which made them what they are, and that primal truth any adequate or thorough theory of truth must seek to win, or at least to recognize. The truth of first principles belongs to such primal truth.

Now, in the case of such divisions of truth as have been considered, it has been said that they are unified in God who, as the supreme or transcendent truth, is each of them without limit. But that is scarcely a satisfactory procedure, since what we are seeking is a coherent system or view of truth to human apprehension. There are inherently good reasons for not now wishing to consider thus truth in God, where it is all-embracing and infinitely complete, but as we may systematically apprehend it. It is not satisfactory to say with Lotze, in his *Logic*, that “truth and the knowledge of truth consist only in the laws of interconnection which are found to obtain universally within a given set of ideas.” This is characteristically a too subjective mode of putting the case, in which ideas figure too much as divorced from reality and experience. I mean, it seems to me too conceptual, too little ontological, in its mode of representation. This task, though it is not now my main concern, must involve taking account of the vast connection of all knowledges, and the linking up and binding together of indi-

vidual truths, into a perfectly harmonious system or synoptic view of truth. I have already spoken of the unity of truth, and unity spells such connection. In this systematic whole or universe of truth, each individual truth, having a value in itself independently of its significance for the whole, has its place and worth; for there it ministers to the highest end or purpose of the whole. But the whole is no mere aggregate or sum. I am speaking of what may be eventually regarded as a metaphysical conception or view of truth.

We now see what kind of value, if value it should be called, truth may be taken to be, namely, a real spiritual appearance, pure, untroubled, objective to, and independent of us, and ideally reached or apprehended by us. Truth is in this sense absolute. This is, no doubt, truth in the abstract, but it is truth with which I have chosen to concern myself, in maintaining that it is not value, in the sense in which we commonly speak of goodness and beauty as values. We may call it truth- or reason-value, no doubt, meaning that it simply is. It is truth which is not affected by the influence of feeling upon our actual thinking. It is truth whose validity is self-evident, or if you will, self-existent. It is somewhat incorrect to say of such truth, as Dr. Schiller does, that "there is no *knowing* without *valuing*" (*Humanism*, p. 10). Such truth as I have been speaking of remains truth, did we neither know it nor value it. As value exists only for a conscious subject, truth in this sense should not be called value, and our knowing it is not necessarily valuing it, in any proper sense of the term. It awaits no consent of our will to its being true, but demands acceptance *nolens volens*. All truth is logical, so far as it is truth, though logic is, of course, concerned only with the formal aspect of truth. It is not a source of material truth, which is found in experience. But there is a relative aspect, in which truth

has a relation to us—in a subjective sense. In this sense, truth may be viewed as a species of value, as it becomes the satisfaction of a want in us. In this connection, I am, of course, not concerned to deny the pragmatist contention as to the part played by feeling upon our thought, when forming our subjective conceptions of truth in practical life and action. But even there, the transcendent element in knowing should not be lost sight of. Nor is the objectivity of truth or knowledge to be sacrificed, even as was done by Lotze, when he admitted “the completely human subjectivity of all our knowledge,” and held that “this universal character of subjectivity, belonging to all knowledge, can settle nothing as to its truth or untruth” (*Metaphysics*, Vol. I, p. 220). The world of reality is not so lost to us that “the changing world of ideas” is all we have to work upon.

But I return to the primacy of the truth-value, with which I started. That primacy cannot be surrendered to those who would reduce the true to the good, or subordinate it thereto. The truth-value is, in my view, to be ranked as conceptually prior, and superior in quality or excellence, to the values of goodness and beauty. The priority of truth is seen in the fact that, in expressing what simply is, it states the ontologically true; it is in closer relation, so to speak, to being than is goodness, which latter waits on desire, which is absent from the concept of being; and in its appeal to reason or intellect, the true is apprehended by the highest, divinest faculty in man. Goodness comes naturally and necessarily after truth, because, in its appeal to feeling, will, and desire, it is constituted by what is of the nature of addition to the true. This is so, because the good is appreciated by the reason or intellect also, seeing that a good, to be desired, must be known and recognized or understood. In other words, more than being or existence is involved in the idea of the good, as the object of

desire. Truth has to do with being simply; it is more simple, more abstract, more absolute, than the good; goodness is, in some sort, a desirable accompaniment of being. That is to say, there is a connotation in goodness not present in truth as concerned with pure being. Yet the true is a good, and the good is something true. Lotze's metaphysical position, that truth is not the *prius*, but dependent on the realm of the good, is one which, in my view, cannot be sustained, because it imports very imperfect appreciation of the primal and absolute Reason, which is at the base and bottom of things. He thinks it is impossible (*Metaphysics*, Vol. I, p. 207) there should be "an absolute *prius*" of forms of any necessary sort, but with glaring inconsistency makes metaphysical truth depend upon a world that rests on the principle of the good, so making the form of the good a preexistent affair after all. As if the ascription of good would endow truth with an objective character which did not belong to it in itself! Lotze's whole denial of absolute truth is to be decisively rejected, as ill-supported and untenable: it is part of the relativity and subjectivity of his whole position. Truth, relative and empirical, is all Lotze has to give us. It is satisfactory to find Ulrici, to whom I have already referred, making the concept of the good rest upon that of the true, despite his treatment of the true as an ethical idea. Better, at any rate, than Dr. Schiller's absurd attempt to subsume the true under the good (*Humanism*, p. 11), which only a defective metaphysical sense could be content to do. For the good, as resting upon the true, is our rational end.

Dr. Schiller is by no means alone in the mistaken notion that the good is such an ultimate and unanalyzable notion; but it is quite delusive to suppose that the good is unaffected by any truth about what is real. An excellent example of this untenable position is afforded by R. L. Nettleship's view of the good, as held by Plato, as "the condition of the

logical *prius*" of being, truth, and order, and not to be "identified" with any one of them. Whether the *ensemble* of Plato's teaching held such a rigid, clear-cut theory of the good, as is here represented, need not now be inquired into. But such a claim, by whomsoever made, cannot be sustained, such a priority of good being non-existent and due to misconception of the nature of the good. A good so anterior and unrelated to anything, and so undefined in character, cannot be satisfactory. I have already spoken of it in connection with Lotze. We must not overlook the criterion of the good, as "something that must," as I have said elsewhere, "be determined by the laws and ideals of reason" (*Studies in European Philosophy*, p. 339). The good "presupposes the true, and the knowledge of it is founded on being" (*ibid.*, p. 339). We have no right to give an irrational cast to ethical good, or to be led by bad psychology into grounding moral distinctions in feeling rather than in reason. The good desired must be ideal good, desired for its own intrinsic worth and value. Such good may be, and indeed is, universally valid, but there is nothing, in the nature of the good, that detracts from the primary character of the truth-value, as applicable test of all objects as well as all subjects. We may say, with Aquinas, that there is a sense in which every entity is true, but it is manifestly absurd to try to confine true and false to mere propositions. In plain fact and actual usage, the true is often taken, broadly, as equivalent to the real. If we speak of true gold, it is because there intelligibly is false gold; if we speak of true hair, it is because there is, in a significant sense, false hair; into the character of these and similar falsities, I am not now concerned to inquire; it is enough to note that there are intelligible and important senses in which the truth test can be applied to objects, and is not confined to propositions. True as an entity in one sense may be, it may be false as related to our thought.

I turn from goodness to another value, that of beauty. Beauty may not be a transcendental quality of being, but the concept of the beautiful follows certain transcendental concepts. Beauty is very closely connected with the true and the good, both of which it presupposes. But the beautiful is not synonymous with the true, since there are many true things that are ugly. Neither the true nor the good is necessarily pleasing, as is the case with beauty. Not Keats alone has identified truth and beauty, but many philosophers also. This, I do not wish to do, but to maintain a distinctiveness for beauty, as was done by Kant and Schiller. We cannot say, "beauty is truth, truth beauty," making a blank identity of them; we must explicate the senses in which both terms are to be understood in making such a statement. Not only must we avoid the mistake of making truth and beauty identical, but shun still more the folly of those who would rank beauty above truth. Even Hegel was too much inclined to treat truth and beauty as one and the same, the beautiful being but the shining manifestation of the idea—a true but incomplete account of beauty, though his theory is of high value. The close connection of beauty with the true is seen in the appeal of beauty to reason or intellect in esthetic contemplation, where even Schopenhauer proclaimed the absence of will, as in the case of the good. Ultimately one must hold beauty to be a revelation of reason, reason in a sensuous form, for it conveys truth or thought of reason. This is not to be wondered at when we consider such elements as completeness or perfection of parts, order or proportion, etc., which engage reason-elements of appreciation. We may rest in the beauty of a great picture, but it is, at the same time, expression and token of truth. But desire is not here active, as in the case of the good, though Baumgarten did postulate excitation of desire; our delight in beauty springs from contemplation, apart from possession; in such apprehension

of beauty, the powers employed are very largely those that belong to reason or the cognitive order, although Kant thought there was also present a harmony with striving and purposeful endeavor. Esthetic feeling is consequent on the primary intellectual apprehension, so that there is a reason-feeling in the perceiving subject. But that does not mean that beauty is not to be loved for its own sake or intrinsic worth. While beauty has its relative aspect or truth, yet objectivity and universality can be claimed for the beautiful. Beauty is thus what Bradley called "the self-existent pleasant." But the appreciation of the beautiful is not self-grounded, but rests on truth of being. It is appreciation of an ideal—an ideal of perfection perceived in the object.

Already in Plato it was seen what beauty alone could do for our knowledge of the good. But beauty is not synonymous with the good, for there are good things which are not beautiful. We do not apply beautiful to the objects of taste, smell, and touch, all good in their way. Goethe ranked the beautiful higher than the good, as being inclusive of the good. The beautiful and the good have sometimes been taken to be identical, the beautiful being regarded as the more ultimate in its freedom from the striving which marks the good. It does not seem to me either a very critical or happy attempt at identification. The emotion of beauty is to be distinguished from the sentiment of the good in quite a number of respects. We cannot, as some philosophers do, subordinate beauty to the good, of which it is said to be one form. It has been properly pointed out that when men speak of the beauty of the good, they are not speaking of beauty "in the specific sense." Its distinctiveness must be maintained, close as their kinship or connection may be. It does not seem to me that we have any right so to merge natural beauty in the morally good. The ideal of beauty and the ideal of the good are not to be

so merged or lost the one in the other. Feeling, in the case of the good, is of more reasoned character: feeling, in the case of beauty, assumes a more sensuous form. Lotze placed beauty midway between the true and the good, but thought it neither solves the theoretic problem of the true, nor the practical problem of the good. A rather obvious reflection, it must be said. But he thinks its mid-position may point to a possible reconciliation of existing contradictions, which does not seem to me to carry us very far, as merely thus stated. But more meaning attaches to the suggestion if and when analysis yields, as features or characters of esthetic emotion, such points as unity in variety, proportion, symmetry, harmony, individuality, and so forth, and if and when the part played by perception, feeling, and imagination in the pleasurable and disinterested contemplation of the beautiful, is considered. In such wise it grows more apparent how the esthetical problem can assume aspects psychological, epistemological, and ontological, which relate it more nearly to the problems of the true and the good than might at first sight appear. To go into that fully would require a discussion by itself. At any rate, being is the seat of value, and not even beauty can be considered without account being taken of the metaphysic of esthetics. Beauty must always have truth of being. But what here concerns us is to say that there is nothing in the problem of beauty that impugns the primacy of the truth-value.

I have held the truth-value to be primary, but I have not meant to suggest that goodness and beauty are merely values to be deduced from the truth-value as fundamental. Central in importance as I take the truth-value to be, to which the other two values are, in a sense, subordinate, yet I think all the three values should be coordinated with each other, and their relations and the character of their absoluteness, marked out. In other words, a reasoned *Wert-*

*gliederung* is our main need. But our leading philosophers speak of values without attempting any such articulation of the values, which they uncritically assume as common sense or mere face values. There is no such thing as an isolated value, every value standing in a system of higher and lower. Objectivity we may claim for all the values, truth, goodness, and beauty, but, in doing so, must remember what a unique and irreducible form of objectivity value is. We must beware of the folly of predicating value of value, as sometimes happens, without any being or reality to which value belongs. Value does not hang in the air in such a fashion, although religious writers on value sometimes notably offend in this way, and occasionally philosophical writers who set an overweening value on value. Even if we hold value to exist before the entrance of desire, yet value is only given for an existing consciousness; without this possibility, a value would be nothing. Nor should we forget that the objectivity of truth is one thing, not to be confounded with the objectivity of either goodness or beauty. If we are to confine ourselves to the truth of experience, it must be experience in the widest sense, as experience of, or in relation to, the transcendent, or what is above mere experience, if any speculative results are to be at all possible to philosophy. For "the concept of experience is itself transcendent of experience, and, in the nature of the case, could admit of no empirical verification." Philosophy is not mere crude empiricism, even if christened "radical," and the question of ultimate truths and principles we have found to be far from an idle or unanswerable one. We have seen that value is always for a subject, but the strange fact remains—one difficult of reconciliation—that value does not yet come and go with the subject that experiences value. Hence some speak of potential values. Of course, there are over-individual values, though they cannot be for us so metaphysically real as those the subject

strikes for himself. There is no satisfactory formal logical or metaphysical principle for the grounding and unification of cosmical values, outside the unity of the subject. You can, no doubt, make value ultimate, more ultimate than existence, but your doing so can never convert a value-judgment into a truth-judgment. When it is thought that values are objective, if they are posited in true value-judgments, the position is an untenable one, because all subjective values, just because they are subjective, must find expression in what are really, *sensu stricto*, false value-judgments. There is no value, properly speaking, outside the world of desire and inclination. Ehrenfels regarded the value of things as due to our desire of them, while Meinong has taken value to be prior, since desire relates to what is not yet present. If value, however, stands or falls with desire, then is value purely relative. Because this is unsatisfactory, the objectivity of absoluteness of the values has been postulated, with variously estimated satisfactoriness. I am inclined to regard the truth-value or existential judgment as the only really absolute one, with what Rickert calls "its category of givenness," and to regard the other values as non-absolute value-judgments. But that does not mean that the values of goodness and of beauty are not absolute in the sense that they are universally valid. If the good be severed from the true, then the objectivity of the good falls away; but the objective truth of the good cannot be so dispensed with; the good has an absolute value, because there is objective good, good that we can isolate in thought as existing in and of itself, and which forms the absolute norm for our will. But this objectivity could not be, if the good were severed from the true, as objectively existent. And so it comes that the values of goodness and of beauty are sustained and illuminated by the truth- or reality-values, since they must be conformable to the truth of things, if they are to be con-

served at all. This, because the content of the practical reason is still an object of inquiry and knowledge to the theoretic reason, even if you say that will- and feeling-values cannot be fully absorbed by this latter reason. When Mr. C. D. Broad says of the theoretic and the practical reason that "there is clearly no question of priority between them" (*Mind*, April, 1918, p. 242), that is an incorrect or defective view; for, in setting up the practical reason, it, with its contents, is, in that very fact, constituted an object of knowledge and investigation to the theoretic reason. It is not necessary that reason should absorb will- and feeling-values, or rob them of their distinctiveness. But it is absurd to suppose that it has not relation to them, or bearing upon them. The theoretic reason is not so divorced from the practical reason, however frequently this Kantian absurdity may have been allowed to permeate modern philosophy. Valuing, by means of the truth-value, and knowing, are loosely called one and the same; but the absolute value is truth, not our knowledge of it. Truth is the last presupposition of every absolutely valid valuation. But it is the first of all preferences, for truth is the most absolute of all things; it is the thought of God, as Kepler found, when he thought God's thoughts after Him. The unity of truth is such that truths are but different aspects or applications of one and the same truth. Truth itself is not multiple; but multiple are the aspects, degrees, and circumstances of its manifestation. Truth, entering the human mind, suffers the weakness of its position there; there is then diversity in the unity of truth. But truth, as it is in itself, is still one. The whole search of man has been for the unity hid behind these diversities. Truth presupposes unity. I do not merely say that truth is one, because God is one; but also, that truth is one, since man is one, and still seeks the unity of truth in its apparent diversities. Theory

of truth is not to be lightly esteemed, for theory is truth itself, and not less rigid and inflexible than truth. It is scarcely possible, in view of what has been said of truth as one, to sustain the position of those philosophers who think there is nothing which can be called the truth, but only an infinite number of truths. For truths do not finally remain isolated and unrelated in the one system of truth. A wholeness of truth we must maintain, whether we can accept any of the proposed systems of truth in whole or not. We have seen that we may not say that a statement, which corresponds to no outer reality, is no truth; that there may be transcendental concepts of truth which we are not entitled to pronounce false; and that there may be statements which we find it quite impossible to doubt, and may have to take for true, though their truth we may never with full certainty be able to pronounce, since they really rest upon our thought. The contention of some philosophers that truth, without a subject that thinks it, is a mere abstraction, is scarcely justifiable, in view of some considerations already advanced. Nor is truth a subjective product, a creation of individual mind, though truth as thought, of course, requires a subject. The value of truth lies precisely in the fact that it is not value; that it is, as truth, objective, irresponsive to desire, and unmoulded by will; and that it is corrective of the terribly and detrimentally characteristic subjectivity of modern thought, which makes so much of the objectivity of value, and so little of the objectivity of truth. This, of course, while I have admitted the sense in which truth may be legitimately regarded as value. But there are truths which are necessarily taken for true; you cannot say that a triangle is a circle, nor a circle a polygon; doubt in such cases is impossible. Such truths are not value, in any proper sense. The opposite of any value can be affirmed; but the opposite of such truths could not be affirmed.

We have seen that there are leading philosophers who have contributed no more toward the discussion of truth than the idle repetition of Hegel's phrase that "the true" is "the Whole." As well tell men that truth is a hopeless quest. That is to remove truth as far as possible from being the central determining power, which I have shown it to be, in human life. If there is to be a whole of truth, one might have supposed it to come through the harmonization and unification of different truths, or levels or spheres of truth. Thus out of truths might spring a whole of truth. But if nothing is true short of the whole, if there are only untruths—truths not completely true—short of this goal, is our whole of truth to be reached by piling up this aggregate of untruths? Kant is even more unsatisfactory than Hegel. For of him we find Dr. Hutchison Stirling saying, "I know not that there is anywhere any truth accessible to Kant" (*What is Thought?* p. 39). Yet truth is not to be escaped. For, as said Aquinas, "He who denies that truth is, grants that truth is; for, if truth is not, it is still true that truth is not." For my own part, I prefer another method of reaching a satisfactory truth-conclusion than that of Hegel. If we take all the different forms, grades, or levels, of truth—logical, conceptual, ontological, moral—and treat them as truth, it does not seem to me at all difficult to conceive their reduction to a final and fundamental unity—a unity of harmony, permanency, consistency, and completeness, subsisting for a mind capable of comprehending, or at least conceiving, them, in their *ensemble* and *rapports*, as convergent, in spite of all apparent divergences and dispersions, toward one central *fons et origo* of truth. In the inexhaustible richness and complexity of truth, as issuing from this common source or center, is overtaken and included all that seems overlooked or imperfectly accounted for in the current talk of truth as concerned only with outer reality. If you say that such a knowledge or view of truth

in its primal unity belongs to the universal order, and appertains in fulness to transcendental Being, I answer, So be it, but we are sufficiently universalized to be able to understand and appreciate the reality of such a view. After all, it should not be forgotten, when we speak of the unity of truth, that the idea of unity has no reality standing by itself, but is included in the idea of being.

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